Management of the Northern atlantic bluefin tuna: An application of C-games

This paper considers the prospects for cooperative multilateral management of the North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks signed in December 1995. A three-players characteristic function game (c-game) is used to analyze the cooperative agreements. The analysis focuses on the sharing of total net returns from cooperation. Three sharing rules are calculated; namely, the Nucleolus, the Shapley value, and the Nash bargaining solution. The analysis is based on simulation and optimization results from a multi-gear, age-structured, bioeconomic model developed for the North Atlantic bluefin tuna fisheries, East and West stocks. The results show, as expected, that significant gains can be attained from cooperation. The different sharing rules for the distribution of gains provide different returns to each player. Nonetheless, the basic transfer payments structure is rather stable. This case study points out some particular situations where these solutions are not enough to guarantee cooperation between all the coastal states.